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In the Supre1ne Court of the 
State of Utah 
LARRY L. JONES and DELLA MAE 
JONES, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
GROW INVESTMENT AND MORTGA.GE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
\ 
CASE 
NO. 9240 
Since this appeal involves a determination of issues of 
both law and fact, a somewhat detailed statement of the 
facts is desirable. 
After some preliminary negotiations, the respondents, 
in the latter part of October, or the forepart of November, 
1958; purchased from the appellant a new "model" home 
in Utah County, Utah, located on real property described 
as follows: 
Lot 3, Block 4, Plat "B", Keyyridge Heights 
Subdivision, Orem, Utah County, Utah 
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Mr. Jones, one of the ·respondents, first saw the prop-
erty between Oetober 20 and October 30, 1958 (Tr. 22). 
He visiifJed the property with the appellant's salesman on 
at least two and possibly three oocasioos (Tr. 26 and 27). 
In addition to those visits, 'he was given a key rto the home 
and dro~e by and looked at it a couple of times and showed 
it to other people (Tr. 27). He made aiTangements to pur-
chase ·the 'house and moved into it, bachelor style, in No-
vember, 1958, and Mrs. Jones arrived from Grand Junc-
tion with the furnishings in December of thart: year (Tr. 
21) . The property was conveyed to the respondents by 
the appeillant on or aborut Decembm- 12, 1958, by warranty 
deed, subject to "deed restrictions and easements of rec-
ord.'' (Complaint, paragraph 1, Findings of Fact, paragraph 
8) 
When Mr. Jones went upon rthe property in the latter 
part of October, 1958, ·he observed the irrigation ditch, of 
which ·he subsequently complained, along the east end of 
the property (Tr. 22, 28). He also observed the extension 
of the ditch as it traversed the east end of the contiguous 
property on the north, and observed that it was "a big 
ditch" (Tr. 28). He could see no difference between this 
open ditch, and irts appearance as it traversed rtne rear of 
his property, and the same ditch as it extended along its 
entire length ~to the north (Tr. 30), and he testified, on cross-
examination, that this extended ditch to the north ap-
peared, at the time of trial, to look the same as his ditch 
did when ·he moved. into the property in question in No--
vember, 1958 (Tr. 30). 
Notwithstanding the fact thaJt Mr. Jones, a drilling en-
gineer by profession (Tr. 29), observed the ditch at the 
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rear of his property and its extension to the north, ,he tes-
tified, on cross-examination, that he did not make any in-
quiries of anyone concerning the dirtch or where any of the 
water went in any of the ditches he observed (Tr. 29 and 
30). The ditch was a large irrigation ditch, about two and 
one-'half feet deep and two and one-half to three feert wide 
(Tr. 44). Although Mr. Jones testified, at one point, rthat 
the ditch appeared to be pretty 'Weill ·filled up (Tr. 22 and 
23), it required about six large dwnp truck loads of gravel 
and dirt to fill the same (Tr. 152) . 
Mr. Jones was :inf.o~ed by Mr. UiJbel, the appellant's 
salesman, orf the existence and na.Jture orf the irrigation ditch 
toward rthe end of Oetober, 1958, and was mfiormed of the 
use made of the same (Tr. 72 and 73). He also was advised 
that he might fence the property prorvided such fence were 
installed on the west side of the ditch (Tr. 73 and 74). Mr. 
Jones' version of this eonversation diffe~ed somewhat from 
the versioo of Mr. Uibel, when Mr. Jones testified in rebut-
tal, but he had already testified on eross-erxamination that 
he made no inquiries of any®e concerning the ditch (Tr. 
29 and 30). 
It is clear from the evidence that in the latter part of 
October, 1958, when the sale of the property was negotia-
ted and in Nove,mber, 1958, when the sale was eonsumm.a-
ted, there was a typical irrigation ditch extending rthe full 
width of the property at the rear therea.f through which, 
at regular intervals, there flowed a stream of water 
amounting to fow- or five second feet (Tr. 47 and 48). 
From the southeast corner of the property, irrigation water 
was conveyed through a covered and water proofed con-
crete pipe (Tr. 91) extending to the west and across the 
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street to other properties. There was no clear proof and 
no substantial evidence that the covered pipe running east 
and west is actually upon the property of the respondents. 
The evidence is more persuasive that it is upon the aJbut-
ting property on the south. 
After the transaction had been concluded and the 
deed to the respondents recorded, the respondents installed 
a fence on three sides of the property and left the front open 
(Tr. 23) and installed a 22 inch pipe along the east end of 
the property and eovered 'the same and leveled the surface 
(Tr. 25). This pipe connected with the. existing pipeline 
running east and west at the south side of the property and 
the existing steel protective grating in thart pipeline was 
removed and reinstalled at the north end of the new pipe-
line by the respondents (Tr. 25). At the time of the trial, 
there was no vi~sible evidence of any ditch or pipeline on 
the respondents' property. .Aibout Christmas time in 1958 
(Tr. 24) and before installing the pipeline at the east end 
of the property, the respondents commenced to fill in the 
open ditch, but received an objection thereto by a lower 
water user as soon as the filling process was started (Tr. 
24). 
The ditch and pipeline in question service approxi-
mately 15 acres of land below the respondentS property 
(Tr. 6). These water users ·have received water through 
the ditch and pipeline in question foc several years, includ-
ing the years 1957 and 19'58 (Tr. 10, 11, 13, 14 and 16). 
The water is used in rturns as prescribed by the water mas-
ter (Tr. 18) , and these turns oocur about once every week 
during the irrigation season (Tr. 18). The usual irriga-
tion season runs from May to the last of October (Tr. 41) 
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(Ex. 4). Mr. Martin, one of the respondents' witnesses, 
testified, on cross-examination, thaJt he used the water 
through the irrigation ditch and pipeline in question "every 
water turn as such is prescribed by the water master 
• • • •" (Tr. 18) and the respondents' witness, Mr. Rapp-
leye, when asked to examine his wateT ticket for 1958 and 
the spring of 1959 (Ex. 4), and state Whether or nort he 
took the water on most of the dates shOIW11 thereon, tes-
tified: "Well, ye~s, most of the time" (Tr. 46). 
Mr. Jones rtestified that .there' was rubbish ·and debris 
in the ditch when he examined it in Ocobm-, 1958, and sta-
ted that it looked ike a prertty well filled up ditch (Tr. 22). 
At the same time, he testified that the ditch looked the 
same at that time as the extension of the same to the north 
looked at the time of the trial (Tr. 30). Referring to pic-
tures of the open ditch extending north from the respond-
ents' property ·which were taken at the ti1me o[ the trial, 
(Ex. 1, 2 and 3), Mr. Kenne,r, the respondents' principal 
witness, testified that it shorwed a ditch "which is prob-
ably quite a typical irrigation ditJoh with grorwth * * * * 
(Tr. 33). 
Sometime afiter a oorvered :pipe had been installed by 
the respondents at the rear of their property, they com-
plained to various officers or personnei of the appel1ant 
company by telephone, and at least on ooe occasion by let-
ter addressed to Mr. Grow, eoncernin:g the cost, only, of 
installing rthe pipe (Tr. 96), but on no occasion, until the 
filing of the complaint, was any mention made by the re-
spondents of the pipeline along the south side of the prop-
erty (Tr. 96 and 97) . There was no easement recorded 
for the irrigation ditch or pipeline (Findings of Fact), but 
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at the time Mr. Jones examined the property in the latter 
part of October, 1958, ·he saw a visible, open irrigation ditch 
across the rear of said property (Findings of Fact). On 
the basis of the foregoing, the respondents sought judg-
ment against the appellant for breach of waiTanJty against 
encumbrances and the court, in its memorandum decision, 
found for the respondents and entered judgment against 
the appellant for damages in the swn of $7'50.00, from which 
decision and judgment the appellant has prosecuted this ap-
peal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO 
FIND, AS A MATTER O·F LAW, THAT THE EXIST-
ENCE 0'F 'THE OPEN, VISIBLE AND NOTORIOUS IR-
RlGATION DITCH AND EASEMENT DID NOT CON-
STITUTE A BREACH OF THE COVENANT AGAINST 
EN·CUMBRANCES. 
POINT II 
THE CO·URT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUS-
ING TO FIND, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT UPON 
OBSE'RVING THE OPEN, VISIBLE, AND NOTORIOUS 
IRRIGATIO'N D1ITCH TRAVERSING SAID PROPERTY 
THE RESPO·NDENTS HAD AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY 
TO INVESTIGATE AND MAKE INQUIRY CONCERN-
ING THE SAME AND THAT INQUIRY OF THE AP-
PELLANT ALONE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT. 
POINT ill 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUs-
ING TO FIND THAT THE EXCEPTION FROM 
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THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE OF THE COVENANT 
AGAINST RE·STRICTIONS AND EASEMENTS OF REC-
ORD, INCLUDED OPEN, VISIBLE, AND NOTORIOUS 
EASEMENTS OBS·ERVED BY THE RESPONDENTS. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND RE-
FUSING TO FIND, AS A MA'I*I'ER OF LAW, THAT THE 
RESPONDENTS WERE ESTOPPED FRO·M ASSERTING 
ANY CLAIM O·F BREACH 0 1F wARRANTY FOR THE 
EASEMENT ENCUMBRANCE BY VIRTUE OF HAV-
ING HlAD ACTUAL NOTICE O·F THE EXIS~NCE OF 
SAID EASEMENT O·R OF HAVING BEEN APPRISED 
OF FACrS IMPOSINIG UP·O·N THEM THE DUTY OF 
FURTHER INQUIRY. 
POTNT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VIS-
ffiLE, OPEN ffiRIGATION D~ITCH ACROSS THE REAR 
OF THE PROPERTY APPEARED TO DEAD-END AT 
THE SOUTH LINE OF THE PREMIS·ES INVOLVED 
AND TO BE ABANDO•NED. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FIND[NG OR ~CONCLUD­
ING THAT THE 22 INCH CEMENT PIPE RUNNING 
IN A WESTERLY ·DIRECTION FROM THE END OF 
THE REAR OPEN DITCH WAS UPON THE PROPER-
TY IN QUESTION AND IN FURTHER FINDING THAT 
SAID PIPELINE WAS COMPLETELY COVERED AND 
NOT VISIBLE TO THE RESPONDENT, LARRY L. 
JONES. 
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POINT vn 
THE ,COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANT'S AGENT REPRESENTED THlAT THE 
DITCH AT THE REAR OF SAID PROPERTY COULD 
BE FILLED IN AND THE YARD LE:vELED AND IN 
FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND, UPON THE EV-
IDENCE, THAT THE APPELLANT'S AGENT IN-
F·01RMED THE RESPONDENT, LARRY L. JO·NES, THAT 
SUCH FENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE INSTALLED 
WEST OF SAID DITCH. 
POINT VIII 
THlE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CON-
CLUDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS FIRST ·LEARNED 
THAT THERE WAS AN EASEMENT BY PRESCRIP• 
TION .A!CROSS THEIR PREMISES FOR SAID IRRIGA-
TION DITCH WHEN THEY HAD PROCEEDED TO 
FILL IN THlE SAID DITCH. 
POINT IX 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RE-
SPONDENTS WERE DAMAGED BY THE PRESENCE 
OF SAID EASEMENT IN THE SUM OF $750.00 AND 
IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND THAT THE 
RESPONDENTS SUFFERED NO DAMAGE. 
POINT X 
THE CO·URT ERRED IN PERMITI'ING THE RE-
SPO,NDENTS' WITNESS, MR. KENNER, TO TESTIFY 
AS TO WHAT HE USUALLY CONSIDERED TO BE A 
REASONABLE WIDTH OCCUPIED BY AN EASE:MENT. 
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POINT XI 
THE ·COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RE-
SPOND·ENTS·' OIBJECTION TO THE TESTIMONY OF 
THE APPELLANT'S WITNESS, MR. GROW, UPON THE 
QUESTION OF WHAT THE CANAL COMPANY DID 
IN THE WAY OF ACQUIESCING TO· CHANGES IN 
THE EASEMENT OVER SAID PR·OPERTY. 
POiNT XII 
THE co~URT ERRED IN OVERRIULIN:G THlE OB-
JECTION OF THE APPELLANT TO THE QUESTION 
POSED BY THE RESPONDENTS TO MR. S.TEIN AS 
TO THE DIFFEREN~CE IN THE VtALUE OF THE LAND 
IN QUESTIO·N IF THE SAME WERE 12 FEET NAR-
RJOWER AND 12 FEET LESS DEEP. 
THE ARGUMENT 
PO·INT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO 
FIND, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT THE EXIST-
ENCE OF THlE OPEN, VISIBLE AND N·OTO~RIOiUS IR-
RIGATION DITCH AND EASEMENT DID NOT CON-
STITUTE A BREACH OF THE COVENANT AGAINST 
ENCUMBRANCES. 
The weight of authority and the better reasoned rule 
in the United States and particularly in the arid and semi-
arid regions of the west supports and sustains the propo-
sition that purchasers of property obviously and notoriously 
subjected at the time to some right of easement or servi-
tude affecting its physical condition, take such property 
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10 
subject to such right withourt any e~ress exceptions in the 
conveyance, and the vendors are not liable on their ·cove-
nants by reason of the existence of such easement. Kl.!fZ 
vs. MC CUNE, 22 Wis. 628, 99 Am Dec 85. See also, 5'5 
Am. Jur. 626, Sect. 154 and Anno. 57 A.L.R. 1427 and 1545 
and 64 A.L.R. 1482 and 1499. The foregoing case of KUTZ 
vs. MC CUNE involved a conveyance of a tract of land by 
a deed containing rbhe usual ocvenants of seisin and against 
encumbrances, without &ceptions to those covenants. At 
the time of the purchase, between 30 and 40 acres of the 
land were flowed ~by a mill-pond created by a dam on land 
not belonging to the grantor, which dam had been main-
tained long enough to create a prescriptive right in the 
owner of it to flow the land in question. The action was 
brought by the grantee for breach of the covenants of sei-
sin and against encumbrances by reason of this existing 
right of flmving. The Court pointed out that the same 
principJe has been applied in the case of highways open and 
in use upon land at the time of the conveyance of the same, 
RAWLE ON COVE'NANTS, 141 et Seq; SCRIBNER vs. 
HOLMES, 16 Ind. 142, and indicated: 
"In the case of fue highway, the doctrine does not rest 
upon the fact that the right is in favor of the public, 
but that rthe easement is obvious and notorious in its 
character, and rthat therefore the purchaser must be 
presumed to have seen it, and to have fixed his price 
for the land with reference to its actual condition at 
the rtime.'' 
The Court went on to state: 
"The substantial fotmdation for :both classes of deci-
sions is the strong, natural presumption that the par-
ties sell on the one hand, and buy on the other, the 
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property in its actual physical condition, allld subject 
to such rights, either in favor of the vendor or others, 
as that physical condition obviously indicates, without 
exceptions or reservations concerning them in the 
deed. So that the decisions that an existing ·highway 
in favor of the public, and a right of flowing the land 
conveyed by the vendor, as it was done at the time of 
the ~conveyance, do not constitute breaches of rthe cov· 
enant against encumbrances fo[' whioh the vendor is 
lia:ble, really rest upon the same principle." 
The reasoning of the Courts in supporting this propo-
sition ·was set out with clarity in the Idaho ease of SCHUR-
GER. vs. MOORMAN, 20 Idaho 97, 117 P. 122, 36 LRA 
N.S. 313, in his language: 
''Encum,brances are of two kinds, viz: (1) such as 
affect the title: and (2) those which affect only the 
physical ~condition of the property. A mortgage or 
other lien is a fair illustration O!f the former; a public 
road or a right-of-way, of the latter. Where eneum-
brances of the former class exist, rthe ,cmrenant referred 
to, under all the authorities, is bvoken the instant it is 
made, and it is of no importance that the grantee had 
notice of them when he took the rtitle. Such mcum-
brances are usually of a temporary cham.oter and 
capable of removal. The very object of the covenanrt 
is to protect the vendee against them. Hence, lmowl-
edge, ·actual or constructive, orf their existence, is no 
answer rto an action for breach of such cmrenant. 
Whe~ however, there is a servitude imposed upon 
the land which is ·visible to the eye·, and which affects, 
not the title, but the ,physical ~condition of the prop-
erty, a different rnle prevails." 
The Idaho case quoted from the Pennsylvania case of 
MEMMERT vs. MCKEEN, 112 Pa 315, 4 ATL 542, in 
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which the Supreme Court o[ Pennsylvania had under con-
sideratioo the question as to whether an open, notorious 
easement of which the purchaser had full notice at rtJhe time 
of the ptWchase and the execution of the deed should con-
stitute a breach of covenant against encumbrances. The 
Idaho ease involved a ~canal which imposed a servitude up-
on the complainant's property. 
In DESVERGERS vs. WILLIS, 56 Ga. 515, 21 Am 
Rep 289, 1cited in t~e Idaho case, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia ·had under eonsid~ation the question as to whether 
or not a ·covenant against encumbrances contained in a deed 
was broken by the existence of a public road over the land, 
which was known to the purchaser at the time of. pur-
chase. In passing upon rthat question, Chief Justice Wax-
ner, speaking for the court, said: 
''The decisions of the Courts of this country are not 
uniform upon this question, but the weight of author-
ity, we think, is that the existence of a public road up-
on the land known to the pwchaser, is not such an 
encumbrance as would constitute a breach of the cov-
enant of warranty. This view of the question is sus-
tained by the better reason, especially as applicable 
to the ·condition of the people of this State." 
In HOLMES vs. DlANFORTH, 83 Me. 139, 21 Atl. 845, 
the Supreme Court of Maine also considered the question 
as to whether or not a eovenant against encwnbrarnces was 
broken by the existence of a public road, and 'held that tile 
purchaser took the deed ·with notice of the existence of 
the road, and that "he must accept the land cum onere, 
and will not be allowed to complain m that encumbrance 
as a breach of the covenants in his deed.'' 
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In the New York case of WHJITBECK vs. COOK, 15 
Johns 483, 8 Am, Dec. 272, involving, also, the question of 
a public road, the court said: 
''It must strike the mind wirth surprise that a person 
who purchases a farm through which a public road 
runs at the time of purchase, and had so run long be-
fore, who must be presumed to have known of the ex-
istence orf the road, and chooses to have it included in 
his purchase, shall turn round on his grantor and com-
plain that the general covenants in the deed ·have been 
broken by the existence of ·what he saw when ·he pur-
chased, and what must 1have enhanced the value of 
the farm. lt is hazarding little to say that sueh an 
attempt is unjust and inequirtaJble, and contrary to the 
universal understanding of ·both vendors and pur-
chasers.'' 
The Ida!ho case which has been cited in some detail 
herein involved land coming under the "Carey Act" grant-
ing easements over public lands, but this was nort the de-
termining factor in rthe decision. 
The question of the effect of the existence of a drain-
age ditch right-of-way upon a covenant against encum-
brances in a deed was also considered in the ease of 
STUHR vs. BUTIERFIELD, 151 Iowa 736, 130 NW 897, 
36 LRA N.S. 321, and the Court employed this language: 
''Ordinarily the allowance of damages to a vendee with 
full lmowledge of the physical conditions evidencing 
an easement which ·cannot be changed subsequently 
by the vendor, and which are so apparent that they 
must ~have been taken inrto account in making the 
transfer, on a breach of warranty against encumbran-
ces immedia.ltely upon receiving a deed containing such 
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warranty, is little less than putting a premiwn on dis-
honesty * * * ,'' 
The California Supreme Court has likewise supported 
the position of the appellant in rthe case of SISK vs. CAS-
WELL, 112 Pac. 185, in 'holding that where there is a phy .. 
si.cal burden on real estate whioh is visible, the presump-
tion, in the absence of an express agreement, is that the 
'burden is not an encumbrance, within a covenant against 
encumbrances. See also, SOMERS vs. LEISER, a recent 
Washington ease, reported in 259 P. 2d, 843, involving a 
visible easement. 
In the Nevada case of MONTESA vs. GELMSTEDT, 
270 P. 2d 668, the Court held that where the plaintiff pur-
chased property from the defendant with full knowledge 
of lateral irrigartion ditches and their use, the plaintiff was 
charged with notice of the apparent easement, and the ser-
vient character of her property, even though the deed to 
her by ,the defendant contained no express reservation 
thereof. This case involved land which had formerly been 
used and cultivated, primarily for agriculture, but was yield-
ing to the inroads of subdivisions and home building. In 
1mB respect, the facts sharply parallel those in the instant 
case. 
Open and visible burdens on property are reciprocal 
and the purchaser of property burdened by such open 
and visible easements is held to take rthe same with the 
benefits and subject to the burdens existing. WAKEN vs. 
G~LESPIE, 15·3 Okla 78, 4 Pac. 2nd 1028; ROLLO vs. 
NELSON, 96 Pac. 263, 34 Utah 116, 26 LRA (N.S.) 315: 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUS-
ING TO FIND, A:S A MA'ITER OF LAW, THAT UPON 
OBSERVING THE OPEN, VISIBLE, AND NOT<)RIOUS 
ffiRIGATION DITCH TRAVERSING SAID PROPERTY 
THE RESPON·DENTS HAD AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY 
TO INVESTIGATE AND MAKE IN1QUIRY CONCERN-
ING THE SAME AND THAT INQUIRY OF THE AP-
PELLANT ALO·NE WAS NO·T SUFFICIENT. 
It is clear from the evidence rthat the respondents made 
no inquiry of anyone concerning the irrigation dirtch they 
observed at the back of the property. In response to a 
question propounded to the respondent, Laxry L. Jones, 
by appellant's counsel: 
Q. ''Did you make any inquiries of anyone ·con-
cerning the ditch tback of ~our place?'' (Tr. 29) 
The respondent answered: 
A. "No sir, I did not." (Tr. 30) 
Open use and enjoyment of an easement over land is 
constructive notice to the purchaser of the land of the exis-
tence of such easement and the rights of the owner thereof 
where inspection of the premises would readily rmreal such 
facts as to put the purchaser ·on inquiry. TAYLOR INV. 
CO. vs. KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
322 Pac. 2nd 817, 182 Kan. 511, citing 28 ·C.J.S. Easements, 
49. . 
In the New Mexico case of MUTZ vs. LE SAGE, 397 
Pac. 2nd 876, 61 NM 219, the court ·held that one Who pur-
chased land across which a well defined, clearly marked 
road ran and who knew that neighbors were using the road, 
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but who failed to make inquiry, oonrerning their right to 
do ·so was charged with nortice of the facts which an inquiry 
would have disclosed. 
The inquiry to be made by one who sees visible signs 
of an easement should not be ·confined to the grantor alone. 
WRIGHT vs. WILLIS, 23 Ky L. Rep. 565, 63 S.W. 991. 
F<or physical conditions which will charge the pur-
chaser of a servient estate with notice of an easement, see 
Annotations at 41 ALR 1442 and 74 ALR 1250. 
POINT ill 
THE CO.URT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUS-
IN·G TO FIND THAT THE EXCEPTION FROM 
TI:IE DEED O~F CONVEYANCE OF THE COVENANT 
AGAINST RESTRICTIONS AND EASEMENTS O·F REC-
ORD, INCLUDED OPEN, VISIBLE, AND NOTORIOUS 
EASEMENTS ORSERVE·D BY THE RESPONDENTS. 
The recorrd disclosed that there were no written ease-
ments of record affecting this property. It is clear in this 
case that the parties considered the existence of the visible 
easement and attempted to provide for an exception there-
to in the wovding of the deed. The fiaot that unfortuitous 
circumstan·ces alone decreed thai the easement, the exis-
tence of which was wen known to all the parties to this 
transaction, was born of prescription and had therefore not 
been recorded, should nort be allowed to defeat the mani-
fest intention Off the parties in exeepting from the usual 
covenants of the appellant's deed "restrictions and ease-
ments of record". Since there were no easements which 
·bad been recorded, it is obvious that the parties contem-
plated the existence of the visible prescriptive easement and 
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sought, by the wording of the deed, to signify the intention 
of the respondents to accept and of the appellant to con-
vey the property burdened with the easemenrt and to pro-
vide for its exclusion from any covenant against encum-
brances. Recordation is manifestly only a substitute for 
actual notice. It is constructive or substituted notice and 
should not be accorded greater weight than the indisput-
able actual notice of the respondents in this case. The 
Kansas case of FEDERAL SA VIN·GS & LOAN INSUR-
ANCE CORPORATIO·N vs. URSCHELL, 157 Pac. 2nd 
805, 159 ~ansas 67 4, ~held thart nortice of an easement ·will 
be imputed to a purchaser where the easement is properly 
recorded or is of such character that a 'PtwChaser, acting 
with ordinary diligence, would learn of its existence. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND RE-
FUSING TO FIND, AS A MA'ITER ~OF LAW, THAT THE 
RESPONDENTS WERE EJSTOPPED FRO'M ASSERTING 
ANY CLAIM OF BREACH 0'F WARRANTY FOR THE 
EASEMENT ENCUMBRANCE BY VIRTUE OF HAV-
ING HlAD ACTUAL NOTICE O~F THE EXISTENCE OF 
SAID EASEMENT OR OF HAVING BEEN APPRISED 
OF FA!CTS IMPQ,SING UP0'N THEM THE DUTY OF 
FURTHER INQUIRY. 
The argument in support of Point III :hereof is equally 
applica!ble to Point IV. 
There can be no question in this case thast the respond-
ents were aware of the existence of the large, open, ~and 
visible irrigation ditch. In response to the question put to 
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the respondent, Larry L. Jones, on cross-examination, as 
to whether or not he saw a ditch there, he replied: 
A. "Yes Sir. I am not blind; I could see that 
ditch, It was a big ditch." (Tr. 28) 
Yet he testified, further, that notwithstanding this fact, 
he did not ·make any inquiry of anyone concerning the ditch 
(Tr. 30). To employ the language of the Supreme Court 
of l!owa in the case of STUHR vs. BUTrERFIELD, cited 
above, to permit the respondents, under these circumstan-
ces, to later recover for breach of warranty against en-
cumbrances ''is little less than putting a premium on dis-
honesty.'' This. is particularly true where, as in this case, 
an attempt was obviously made to limit the covenants of 
the grantor in its deed by excepting easements obviously 
thought to be of record. In determining the existence of 
such an easement, the purchaser of the servient estate is 
chargeable with knowledge of facts which he would have 
acquired by the exercise of ordinary diligence and the ob-
servance of facts of common knowledge in the vicinity. 
BERLIN vs. ROBBINS, 38 P. 2nd, 1047, 180 Wash., 176. 
For physical conditions which will charge fue pur-
chaser of a servient estate with notice of an easement, see 
annotations at 41 ALR 1442 and 74 ALR 1250. 
POINT V 
1"HE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VIS-
IBLE, OPEN IRRIGATION DITCH ACROSS 1"HE REAR 
O·F THE PROPERTY APPEARED TO DEAD-END AT 
1"HE SOUTH LINE OF 1"HE PREMISES INVOLVED 
AND TO BE ABANDONED. 
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The finding of the Court that the ditch across the rear 
of the property which the respondent, Larry L. Jones, ob-
served appeared to dead-end at the South line of the prem-
ises involved and to be abandoned is eontrary to the great 
weight of the evidence and cannot be reconciled with the 
Wlcontroveflted and unbiased evidence and testimony found 
in the record. The plaintiff, according to his own admis-
sion, viewed the property :between the 20th and the 30th 
day of Octobe·r, 1g.5g (Tr. 22). According to ·his own tes-
timony, the ditch at the rear o[ the property was ·clearly 
visible (Tr. 28) and he observed the extension of ·the ditch 
for an indefinite distance to the north (Tr. 28). Even if 
it be conceded that fuere may have been some trash and 
debris in the ditch, the respondents' testimony that the 
ditch appeared to dead-end at ~his property and to be aban-
doned is not ·credible when considered with the testimony 
of the lower water users to the effect that the' irrigation 
season extended from May to the end of October, during 
which time the water users 'had water turns ~about once 
every week from a stream carrying from four to five sec-
ond feet (Tr. 18, 41, 46, and Ex. 4). The testimony of Mr. 
Martin and Mr. Rapleye, both respondents' witnesses, 
shows that the ditch in question was being actively used 
at almost exactly the time when Mr. Jones, according to his 
own admission, examined the p~operty. A ditch character-
ized in the manner the respondent, Larry L. Jones, attemp-
ted to ·characterize it, eould not posstbly have aooomm~ 
dated an irigation stream of four to five second feet and 
the consistent and extended use of the ditch for irrigation 
purposes for the entire irrigation season of 1958 eould not 
have rendered to the ditch ·an appearance of being aban-
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doned. This physical evidence has to be set completely at 
naught as well as the testimony of Mr. Uibel to the effect 
that 'he informed the respondent, Mr. Jones, respecting the 
nature and use of the ditch, and the testimony of Mr. Jones 
must be accepted in toto concerning a conversation about 
the ditch which he testified to having 'had with Mr. Uibel 
after ·he had already testified on cross-examination that he 
made no inquiry of anyone eoncerning the ditch at the back 
of the place (Tr. 29 and 30, to sanction the finding of rthe 
court. The respondent evidently encountered no difficulty 
in discovering the grate at the easterly end of the covered 
pipeline and removing it to the north end of the pipe he in-
stalled and it is submitted that the law, und& the circum-
stan,oes, imposed upon him a duty of more than "a casual 
inspection,'' as set out in the Memorandum Decision of the 
Court. It is inherently improbable that the volume of wa-
ter which was oonveyed through the ditch for the entire 
irrigation season of 1958 and emending to the end of Oc-
tober of that year oould have created such a situation in 
the ditch as to leave the respondent or anyone else wtih the 
impression that the ditch had been abandoned and renders 
equally improbable the -conclusion that he could have failed, 
on reasonable inspection, to see where the ditch connected 
with the covered pipeline rU!Illling east and west along the 
sourth side of the p~operty. The pictures of the di1Jch to the 
noi"tJh taken at the time of trial (Ex. 1, 2 and 3) clearly de-
pict a typical irrigation ditch, and these pictures, it must 
be remembered, were taken long after the end of the irri-
gation season. 
In M~C DOUGAL vs. LAME, 39 Ore. 212, 64 Pac. 864, 
the Supreme Court of Oregon held that a ditch by which 
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water was diverted from its natural ehannel for ·mining pur-
poses was notice of the right to maintain irt across the prem-
ises, where, fior part of the way at least, its existence was 
plaintly marked upon the ground, although elsewhere it 
had become nearly filled with debris. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDIN·G OR CONCLUD-
IN~G THAT THE 22 INCH CEMENT PIPE RUNNING 
IN A WESTERLY DiiREJCTION FRJO~M THE END OF 
THE REAR ~OPEN DITCH W.A:S UPON THE PROPER-
TY IN QUESTIO·N AND IN FURTHER FINDING THAT 
SAID PIPE'LINE WAS CO·MPLETELY COVERED AND 
NOT VISIBLE TO THE RESPONDENT, LARRY L. 
JONE.S. 
The argum·ent sUJbmitted under Point V above is equally 
applicable to Point VI, and may be addressed 1Jo the same. 
It is submitted further, that there is no clear or convinc-
ing evidence in the record establishing that the :covered 
pipeline on the south is even upon the property in question. 
The pipeline was installed on the south in the spring 01f 1957 
(Tr. 90 and 91). Mr. Grow testified that ·he was not sure 
that the pipeline was even on Lot 3, Block 4, Keyyridge (Tr. 
90). W1hen first asked by respondents' counsel where, with 
respect to the south side of the lot on which the house in 
question was situate, the ditch ran west, Mr. Rappleye, the 
respondents' ·witness, testified: 
A. "It went right through the fenee line on the 
next place south of it" (Tr. 7). 
It is true that after some goading and ~helpful question-
ing by counsel, the witness placed the ditch on the lot to 
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the north of that fence (Tr. 8). How he -could testify as to 
the position of the ditch with reference to the fence prior 
to the installation of the pipeline in 1957, or to the pipeline. 
itself, cannot be understood, since ·the fence referred to in 
the picture the witness was examining when the question 
was propormded to him was not installed until after the ac-
quisition of the property by the respondents in the latter 
part of 1958 (Tr. 23). The COurt's finding is rendered 
more impotent by the testimony of Mr. Heal to rthe effect 
that the distance between the north and south fence lines 
at the front of the property measured between 70 and 71 
feet, (Tr. 147) by actual measurement, whereas the cor-
responding distance shown on the plat of the survey is 68.2 
feet (Tr. 119). This issue becomes importanrt in view of 
the fact that all the real estate people who testified as to 
damage, attributed such dam.age, almost exclusively, to the 
pipeline on the south, and almost completely disconnted any 
damage on account Olf the easement at the rear of the prop-
erty (Tr. 54, 112, 138, and 145). 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANT'S AGENT REPRESENTED THAT THE 
DITCH AT THE REAR OF SAID PROPERTY COULD 
BE FILLED IN AND THE YARD LEVELED AND IN 
FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND, UPON THE EV-
IDENCE, THAT THE APPELLANT'S A:GENT IN-
FORMED THE RES.PONDENT, LARRY L. JONES, THAT 
SUCH FENCE WO·ULD HAVE TO BE INSTALLED 
WEST O,F SAID DITCH. 
On this point, there is a conflict in the testimony of 
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LaiTy L. Jones and ~red ,Uibel. We believe, however, that 
Mr. Ui!bel's testimony more nearly accords wirth what the 
physical features of the land revealed. Also, it should be 
remembered that 1before giving his version of the conver-
sation with Mr. Uibel, Mr. Jones had already testified, on 
cross-e~amination, that he did not make any inquiries of 
anyone concerning the ditch ba:ck of the place (Tr. 30). In 
the face of the undisputed use that had already been made 
of the ditch to ~convey an irigation stream oonsisting of four 
to five second feet of water :fjor the full irrigation season 
of 1958, extending to the last of o~otober of that year, the 
respondents' version of the conversation with Mr. Uibel is 
not worthy of belief. 
POINT VIII 
TH!E COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CON-
CLUDING THAT THE RE'SPO,NDENTS FIRST LEARNED 
THAT THE~RE WAS AN EASEMENT BY PRESCRIP--
TION ACROSS THEIR PREMISES F101R SAID ffiRIGA-
TION DITCH WHEN THEY HAD PRO,CEEDED TO 
FILL IN THIE SAID DITCH. 
There is no question but that the Respondent, Larry 
L. Jones, observed the ditch at the rear of the property, in 
October, 1958, before a sale of the property was consum-
mated and recognized that it was an irrigation ditch (Tr. 
28). Observing the ditch as he did, within days of its act-
ual use, he was 'charged with knowledge of those facts which 
the exercise of ordinary diligence would have revealed and 
with notice of those facts which a reasonable inquiry woruld 
have disclosed. BERLIN vs. ROBBINS, 38 Pac. 2d 1047, 
180 Wash. 176; MUTZ vs. LE SAGE, 297 Pac. 8d 8.76, 61 
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N.M. 219; FEDERAL SAV. & LOAN IN.S. CORP. vs. UR-
SCHEL, 157 Pac. 2d 805, 159 Kan. 674. See also, PIO-
NEER MINING C·O. vs. BANNOCK GO,LD MINING COM-
PANY, 60 Mont, 25·4, 198 Pac, 748, which held that the 
existence of a ditch and flume running to a mill was notice 
to the pUI'!chaser of the servient estate. Also, annotations 
at 41 ALR 1442 and 74 ALR 1250. 
POINT IX 
THE COURT E.RRED IN FINDING THAT THERE-
SPONDENTS WERE D~AMAGED BY THE PRESENCE 
O~F SAID EASEMENT IN THE SUM OF $750.00 AND 
IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND THAT THE 
RESPONDENTS SUFFERED NO DAMAGE. 
It is, of course, Appellant's primary position oo this 
appeal that the existence of the open, visible, and notori-
ous irrigation ditch and easement did not constitute any 
breach of Appellant's 1covenants against encumbrances and 
that, therefore, no damages can properly be found in favor 
of the respondents. But even if the circumstances of this 
case spelled out a cause of action for the respondents, which 
the appellant denies, nevertheless, there is no competent 
evidence upon which damage in the sum of $750.00 or in 
any amount could be properly found by the court. In the 
first place, ·all of the veal estate people who testified on the 
element of damage, and which was the only evidence sub-
mitted on that subject, indicated that no damage of any 
consequence could be attributed to the ditch at the rear of 
the property (Tr. 54, 112, 136, and 145). This means rthat 
rthe damage, if any, must be attributed solely to the covered 
pipeline on the South and this poses fu.rfuer difficulties: 
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First, there is no concrete or substantial evidence that this 
pipeline is even on the property in question. On the con-
trary, there is substantial evidence 1Jo the effect that it is 
not (Tr. 7, 90, and 147). Second, the only testimony Which 
accorded to the pipeline (assuming it was upon the poperty) 
any substantial damage whatsoever was that of Mr. Ken-
ner, the respondents' W1itness, who predicated his estimate 
of such damage upon matters of assumption and conjecture 
void of legal sanction. First, he admitted that his estimate 
was one of speculation (Tr. 55). Second, he stated that 
the element of damage involved the considerations the ditch 
would create in the mind of a potential buyer (Tr. 5-3.) . The 
best evidence on :this item is a subjective examination of 
the feelings of the buyers at the time of purchase. In the 
light of Mr. Jones' testimony, this was evidently not a pro-
per element to consider. W'hen asked by his counsel: 
Q. ''Would you have purchased this property had 
you known there was a ditch alon.g two sides of it?" 
(Tr. 25) 
he answered: 
A. "In a way we would 1have and in a way we 
wouldn't ·have. The only argument would :have been 
whether we wanted our boy to be around an open ditch 
or not." (Tr. 26) 
To this add the further fact fuat, with such knowledge, 
they did purchase the property. Mr. Kenner's testimony 
was not predicated on thls latter consideration and it ,jg 
clearly evident that the dirtch made no ~serious impression 
upon the respondents in reaching their decision to buy the 
property. Third, Mr. Kenner testified that the biggest single 
factor which he considered was ''would that ditch ~always 
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exist in its present sport or was there permission to change 
that right of way" (Tr. 55). This consideration was not 
legally proper in view of the fact that there was not a scin-
tilla orf evidence in the record to the effect that the ditch 
would not always exist in its present location and the only 
evidence offered on thart subject was rejected by the coort 
(Tr. 132). Fourth, Mr. Kenner's testimony was predicated 
on the legal conclusion and erroneous assumption that the 
pipeline on the south, in effect, consumed 10 to 16 feet of 
the respondents' land (Tr. 64) and he evidently attributed 
. to that footage 100% loss orf value. Fifth, at another point 
in his testimony, Mr. Kenner gave the impression that he 
attrlburted his depreciation rate of 10% largely to the pres-
ence of rtJhe 90 degree turn in the ditch (Tr. 60), but with-
out showing that any damage or problem had ever resulted 
from such turn and admitting that he had never run into 
a situation where depreciation had been predicated on such 
a factor (Tr. 60). The entire line of MT. Kenner's testi-
mony was contradictory and based on assumptions and le-
gal conclusions i~mproperly admitted into evidence. On the 
other ·hand, the testimony of Mr. Stein, Mr. Heal, and Mr. 
Swapp all support the ·conclusion that the damage, if any, 
was strictly nominal (Tr. 112, 116, 125, 136, 138, 141, and 
145). 
It should also be noted that the ditch at the rear of the 
property constituted a potential benefit to the responden1s. 
Fi'rst, the lower water users all rent their irrigation water 
(Tr. 19) from year to year and there is no reasoo to sup-
pose that the respondents could nort be accorded the same 
privilege and utilize such water to service their lot. In ad-
dition, as indi~cated by Mr. Heal, some people would con-
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sider the presence of the ditch as an asset and conclude 
that it enhaneed the value of the property (Tr. 141). See 
14 Am Jur. 555, Sect. 110, citing STUHR vs. BU'I*I'ER-
FIELD and SCHURGER vs. MO'O·RMAN, cited herein. 
POINT X 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMI'ITING THE RE-
SPONDENTS' WITNESS, MR. KENNER, TO TESTIFY 
AS TO WHAT HE USUALLY CO·NSIDERE·D TO BE A 
REASONABLE WIDTH OCCUPIED BY AN EASEMENT. 
Without specifying whether the easement was for the 
purpose of a % inch pipeline or an airplane runway, the 
court permitted respondents' counsel to ask Mr. Kenner 
this question: 
Q. ''Where you are appraising a piece of prop-
erty, Mr. Kenner, and the easement is a prescriptive 
easement, what do you usually oonsider as a reason-
able width to take into consideration as being occu-
pied by the easement?" (Tr. 64) 
Over objection of Appellant's eounsel, the witness was 
permitted to answer and the objection ·was overruled (Tr. 
64). The answer of Mr. Kenner was as follows: 
A. "This is a practical point, I think, large~ly, and 
I would say that from 12 to 16 feet----Qtr rather, from 
10 to 16 feet is the conventional or usual prescribed 
easement." (Tr. 64) 
This testimony and the ruling of the court with re-
spect thereto were improper for the reasons (1) No suffi-
cient foundation was laid to determine what type of ease-
ment was referred to and (2) being a prescriptive ease-
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ment, no consideration was given to the essential element 
of the nature and extent of use upon which the easement 
was esrtaJbUshed, and (3) the question called for a legal 
conclusion. The answoc of the witness was significant and 
prejudicial, bearing oo. the measure of damage, since he 
accorded to his judgment of the damage suffered, consid-
erations of the quantity of land taken by the easement. 
POINT XI 
THE CO·URT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THlE RE-
SPONDENTS' OBJECTION TO THE TESTIMONY OF 
THE APPELLANT'S WITNESS, MR. GROW, UPON THE 
QUESTIO·N OF WHAT THE CANAL COMPANY DID 
IN THE WAY O·F ACQUIESCING TO CHANGES IN 
THE EASEMENT OVER SAID PROPERTY. 
Testifying on the measure of damage to be accorded 
the presence o[ the easement, the court permitted MT. Ken-
ner to state that the biggest single factor which he 1ried 
to take into consideration was this: "Would that ditch 
always exist in its present spot or was there permission to 
change that right of way" (Tr. 55). At the same time, 
the court sustained the objection of Respondents' counsel 
to the :ftoHowing testimony of Mr. Grow bearing on that 
subject~ 
A. ''. . . . . so I called the Canal people and, as 
I recall there were two of the Canal executives--! re-
member picking up one O!f them-and took them out 
to look at the situation and get their recommenda-
tions.'' (Tr. 90) 
The court first sustaind the respondents' objection to 
this testimony on the ~orund that it was not material (Tr. 
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91). Later, in the re-direct examination of Mr. Stein, the 
following exchange between the court and counsel ensued: 
THE CO·URT: ''The objection will be sustained. 
May I ask if you have any evidence at all as to whether 
or not this pipeline was constructed with the acquies-
cence or at the instance of the Canal Company or any-
thing like that?" (Tr. 132) 
MR. BULLOCK: If the court please, you sus-
tained the objection when I was asking Mr. Grow con-
cerning the matter and I think it error to have done so. 
That was the purpose, :to show that the pipeline was 
put in there with the full acquiescence of the Canal 
Company and they specified the type of pipe that should 
go in there and the size." (Tr. 132) 
MR. SORENSEN: "We t;hink we would have no 
objection if ·he brought in a member of the Canal Com-
pany to testify to that." (Tr. 132) 
MR. BULLOC'K: "I don't think we need a mem-
ber of the ·Canal Company to say so." (Tr. 132) 
THE COURT: "I imagine you would. It would 
be hearsay.'' (Tr. 132) 
THE COURT: "I think it would be hearsay if you 
had Mr. ·Grow state what the ·Canal·Company said or 
did." (Tr. 132) 
MR. BULLOCK: "I don't intend to have him state 
what they said. I intend to :have him state what he 
did and who was present at the time that he did it and 
what he did." (Tr. 132) 
THE COURT: "I think it is still !hearsay." (Tr. 
133) 
:MR. BULLOCK: "Well then, your ·honor's rul-
ing with respect to the matters that I wanted to go 
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into With Mr. Grow still stands, is that correct?" (Tr. 
133) 
THE COURT: "Yes." (Tr. 133) 
The foregoing ruling was clearly error and was pre--
judicial. It was erroneous because it ~eluded testimony 
. 
as to what the parties did as distinguished from what the 
parties said, with reference to the installation of the pipe-
line on the South. The testimony offered was clearly not 
hearsay and was competent out of the mouth of Mr. Grow. 
The ruling was prejudicial because the court had already 
permitted Mr. Kenner to testify that he thought the big-
gest single factor 'he tried to take into ·consideration in as-
sessing the damage was: "Would that ditch always exist 
in its present spot or was there permission to change that 
right of way?" (Tr. 55) 
POINT XII 
THE CO'URT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE OB-
JECTION OF THE APPELLANT TO THE QUESTION 
PO'SED BY THE RESPONDENTS TO MR. STEIN AS 
TO THE DIFFEREN~CE IN THE VALUE OF THE LAND 
IN QUESTION IF THE SAME WERE 12 FEET NAR-
R~O,WER AND 12 FEET LESS DEEP. 
The same argument addressed to Point X of this brief 
is applicable to Point XIT. 
Over the objection of Appellant's counsel, respondents' 
counsel was permitted to ask Mr. Stein on cross-examina-
tion if the value olf the house would be different if the lot 
werre 12 feet narroiWer and 12 feet less deep (Tr. 123). 
Ove~r Appellant's further objection, respondents' counsel 
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was further permitted to attempt to educate the witness on 
the conclusions of law, as follows: 
Q. "You know, don't you, that of course an ease-
ment for a ditch takes more area than the ditch itself 
occupies.'' ( Tr. 126) 
A. "It could, yes." (Tr. 126) 
Q. "You know why, don't you?" (Tr. 126) 
A. "Yes." (Tr. 126) 
Q. "That is, the OW!Ilers of the ditch have a right 
to go on the premises with equipment and men?'' (Tr. 
126) 
Rights under a prescriptive easements are pvoscribed 
and measured by the natu~re and ertent of use under which 
·the easement was created, and the whole tenor of the tes-
timony at this point and in this vein, preswned fiacts not 
in evidence and rested upon legal conclusions. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in its Findings af Fact as sert out 
herein and in its application of the law thereto, and the 
Findings and Conclusions and Judgment of the court should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
